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This paper provides a detailed comparison of the following five cases of Japanese and 
European clusters in biotechnology: (1) Kobe Biomedical Innovation Cluster (KBIC) in 
Kobe (Japan), (2) Fuji Pharma Valley Cluster in Shizuoka Prefecture (Japan), (3) BioM 
Biotech  Cluster  in  Munich  (Germany),  (4)  BioRegion  Rhine-Neckar  in  Heidelberg 
(Germany), and (5) Alsace BioValley Cluster in Strasbourg (France). We pay special 
attention  to  the  cluster  policy  and  its  management  by  each  region‘s  core  cluster 
management organization.  Information on the focal clusters and the management of 
cluster policies has been obtained through interviews with the cluster directors and core 
staff in 2010 and 2011. We find several similarities and differences among the five cases 
of Japanese and European clusters. We also discuss how the management of cluster 
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Industrial  and  intellectual  clusters  have  been  attracting  much  attention  from 
practitioners,  policymakers,  and  academia.  Such  high-tech  clusters  are  expected  to 
contribute  to  regional  innovation  and  development,  especially  by  promoting 
collaboration and knowledge spillover among research organizations and local firms
1. 
        To date, most studies on clusters comprise  detailed case studies on specific 
cluster areas such as Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994; Porter et al. 2001). Several studies 
have also been made on cluster policies in different countries   (Borras  and Tsagdis 
[2008] for several European  countries; Dohse [2000, 2007] for Germany), but only a 
few of them empirically investigate the effects of cluster policies  on participant firms 
using micro data (Falck et al.  [2010] for Germany; Nishimura and Okamuro  [2011a, 
2011b]  for  Japan)
2.  The  management  of  cluster  policies  by  cluster  management 
organizations  is  also  an  important  issue  and  one  that  is  expected  to  affect  the 
performance of each cluster (Council on Competitiveness 2007; Jungwirth et al. 2011). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, few in-depth studies have been conducted on 
the management of clusters by management organizations on  the basis of comparisons 
between clusters in various national contexts. 
       Thus, this paper provides a detailed comparison of the following five cases of 
Japanese and European clusters   in biotechnology: (1)  Kobe Biomedical Innovation 
Cluster (KBIC) in Kobe (Japan), (2) Fuji Pharma Valley Cluster in Shizuoka Prefecture 
(Japan), (3) BioM Biotech Cluster in Munich (Germany), (4) BioRegion Rhine-Neckar 
in Heidelberg (Germany), and (5) Alsace BioValley Cluster in Strasbourg (France). We 
selected these cluster regions for three reasons. First,  these are the representative 
intellectual clusters of biotechnology and life science in  their  respective  countries. 
Second, they  have  all received (and are still receiving) public subsidy from the ir 
national (federal) governments. Third, they all have distinct core organizations for the 
management of cluster policies. 
       In this research, we focus on biotechnology clusters for the following reasons. 
                                                   
1  Many previous studies have suggested that geography matters in determining the innovative capability 
(e.g., Jaffe et al. 1993; Anselin et al. 1997; Acs et al. 2002; Fritsch and Franke 2003; Dahl and Pedersen 
2004; Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Audretsch et al. 2005; Rondé and Hussler 2005; Furman et al. 2006; 
Squicciarini 2008; Aldieri and Cincera 2009; Abramo et al. 2011). 
2  According to Okubo and Tomiura (2010), Duranton (2011), and Martin et al. (2011), there is a huge 
amount of literature on the economies of agglomeration (Rosenthal and Strange 2004; Martin et al. 2008) 
and  the  clustering process/mechanism in an established cluste r (Pyke  et al. 1990; Sa xenian 1994; 
Markusen 1996; Gordon and McCann 2000; Maskell 2001; Martin and Sunley 2003; Hospers et al. 2009). 
Unfortunately, as Yang et al. (2009) and Martin et al. (2011) indicate, there are few empirical studies that 
examine the condition of the effective organization of cluster policies.   3 
 
First, the field of biotechnology is regarded as representative of high-tech industries in 
Japan,  Germany,  and  France,  countries  with  a  rapidly  aging  population.  Further, 
biotechnology is characterized as one of the science-based industries in which formation 
of networking between industries and universities is especially important for innovation 
(Mayer-Krahmer and Schmoch 1998). National cluster policies toward biotechnology 
are therefore emphasized in these  countries. Moreover, it is desirable to focus on a 
specific technological field so that we may exclude differences in cluster management 
policies due to technological differences. 
       We pay special attention to the cluster policy and its management by the core 
cluster  management  organization  in  each  region
3. More concretely,  we address the 
research  questions  of  how  cluster  management  organizations  prepa red  for  the 
application for cluster competition, selected research consortia members, and allocated 
R&D subsidy. Further, we are interested to find out how project monitoring and project 
evaluation are done in each region. We also provide information on the types of support 
measures  offered  by the cluster management organizations and their motivation  for 
coordination with other cluster projects. We also discuss how the management of cluster 
policies by the core management organizations may be related with the performance of 
regional clusters. 
       We obtained information on the focal clusters and the management of cluster 
policies by conducting interviews with the focal cluster directors and core staff at Kobe 
in December 2010, at Munich, Heidelberg, and Strasbourg  in February 2011, and at 
Shizuoka in July 2011, and from the websites of the related ministries and focal cluster 
management organizations, listed after the references. 
  The remainder of this  paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews  the 
national cluster policies of Japan, Germany, and France. Section 3 presents an overview 
of the regional characteristics of each cluster, including historical review and regional 
potential. Section 4 compares in detail the management of cluster policies by the core 
management organizations in each cluster region  (focusing on the application process 
for cluster competition,  management and evaluation of R&D projects , and  support 
programs). In Section 5, we discuss how the management of cluster policies may be 
related to the performance of regional clusters. We summarize and conclude our paper 
in Section 6. 
                                                   
3  As indicated in McDonald et al. (2006), no general consensus has been achieved yet on the spatial, 
technological, and industrial structure as well as the institutional characteristics of industrial clusters. In 
this paper, we do not go into further details of cluster typology, but examine the cluster policies as defined 
by  each  country.  Cluster  policies  are  regarded  as  regional,  industrial,  or  technological  policies  and 
implemented as targeted subsidization or networking support under any of these aspects. 4 
 
2. National Cluster Policies in Japan, Germany, and France 
 
This section presents an overview of the cluster policies in Japan, Germany, and France. 
Specifically, we compare the selection procedure in cluster competition and the degree 
of competition. 
 
2.1. Cluster policy in Japan 
Japan  has  two  focal  national  cluster  programs  (see  Table  1  for  more  details):  the 
Industrial  Cluster  Project  (ICP)  by  the  Ministry  of  Economy,  Trade  and  Industry 
(METI) since 2001
4  and  the Knowledge Cluster Initiative (KCI)  and  the  City Area 
Program  by  the  Ministry  of  Education,  Culture,  Sports,  Science  and  Technology 
(MEXT) since 2002.  The MEXT programs were reorganized and integrated into  the 
Regional Innovation Cluster Program in 2010. 
A  knowledge  cluster,  as  defined by MEXT,  is a system for technol ogical 
innovation.  Organized  by   local  initiatives  including  universities  and  other  public 
research institutes with original R&D plans, the system also stimulates the participation 
of private companies. The selection procedure of KCI is characterized as  a top-down 
process with limited competition. MEXT selected 30 potential regions in which core 
research institutes and industrial infrastructure  for specific technological fields  exist, 
and invited local organizations to submit proposals for a business plan of the industrial 
cluster  including cooperative R&D projects . Based on the proposals, MEXT finally 
selected 12 regions (including KBIC) to be supported by the first-round KCI from 2002 
to 2006. The total KCI budget for the period 2002–2009 was around 68.5 billion yen. 
MEXT changed their rules since 2007 (the beginning of the second round) to enable the 
government induce local authorities to partially finance R&D projects. 
The City Area Program is a minor version of KCI, with a smaller cluster area 
and smaller budget. Unlike KCI, the selection procedure of the City Area Program, at 
least in the first round, was characterized as a competitive bottom-up process
5. Each 
target area obtains financial support from MEXT for three years.  Fifty-nine areas were 
                                                   
4  See Nishimura and Okamuro (2011a, 2011b) for more details of this program. The program completed 
the second period in 2010. In the third and current period since 2011, in principle, the government no 
longer provides direct financial support to the individual industrial clusters; each cluster organization has 
to finance its support measures by itself. However, the government will continue its financial support to 
specific  technology  areas  (e.g.,  biotechnology)  that  are  especially  important  from  the  viewpoint  of 
national strategy. 
5  For the moment, n o public information is available on the selection process of this program. We 
obtained related information in a telephone interview with a MEXT bureaucrat.  He told us that at the 
beginning, it was not easy to collect many proposals so that in fact the competition for selection may not 
have been hard.   5 
 
supported in the first round (2002–2006), of which 22 obtained support twice: relatively 
well-performing areas have a good chance of being selected later to the higher category 
―development  stage‖ with  a  doubled budget.  Fuji Pharma Valley is  one of the nine 
cluster areas supported by the City Area Program from 2004 to 2006 (general stage), 
and one of the ten areas supported from 2007 in the development stage. The total budget 
of the City Area Program for the period 2002–2006 is estimated to be around 20 billion 
yen. MEXT changed their rules since 2006 to enable the government subsidize up to 
50% of the total budget. The other half should be financed by local authorities and 
others. 
KBIC,  one  of  the  most  popular  bio-clusters  in  Japan,  has  received  public 
support from both ICP and KCI (but mainly from KCI). The core cluster management 
organizations  in  KBIC  are  the  City  of  Kobe  and  the  Foundation  for  Biomedical 
Research  and  Innovation  (FBRI).  Fuji  Pharma  Valley  is  an  interesting  case  of 
biomedical cluster initiatives that has been supported from its beginning by the City 
Area Program of MEXT. Its core cluster management organization is the Pharma Valley 
Center (PVC), which belongs to a public foundation for industrial development. 
 
2.2. Cluster policy in Germany 
In  Germany,  BioRegio,  enacted  in  1996,  was  the  first  national  program  with 
competition  of  proposals  for  developing  innovation  networks
6.  Both  the  Munich 
Biotech Cluster  and  BioRegion Rhine-Neckar  were  selected as  the  regional cluster 
projects and supported  by BioRegio for five years. Following BioRegio, there were 
several cluster policies, mainly passed by the German Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research (BMBF), such as BioProfile, BioFuture, EXIST,  and InnoRegio
7. This 
paper focuses on the  most recent national cluster policy, ―Spitzencluster-Wettbewerb‖ 
(Leading-Edge Cluster Competition), operational since 2008. 
The purpose of Spitzencluster-Wettbewerb is to lead Germany to the top of the 
league of technologically advanced nations. The selection procedure of this national 
cluster competition is characterized as a bottom-up process with strong competition. For 
example, only five regions were selected from among 38 applicants in the first-round 
cluster competition by an independent jury (one bio-cluster in five regions). The total 
budget of Spitzencluster-Wettbewerb for the 2008–2014 period is around 400 million 
euro. 
BioRegion  Rhine-Neckar  was  selected  in  the  first  round  of  the 
                                                   
6  See Dohse (2000, 2003) for more details of the BioRegio project. 
7  See Eickelpasch and Fritsch (2005) for more details of these projects. 6 
 
Spitzencluster-Wettbewerb program in 2008. The core cluster management organization 
in BioRegion Rhine-Neckar is BioRN Cluster Management GmbH (hereafter BioRN). 
The  Munich  Biotech  Cluster  won  the  second-round  competition,  and  has  received 
public support since 2010 for the M4 project for personalized medicine and targeted 
therapeutics. The core management organization of this cluster project is BioM Biotech 
Cluster Development GmbH (hereafter BioM). 
 
2.3. Cluster policy in France 
In France, the Local Productive Systems (LPS) issued in 1998 can be seen as the first 
national cluster policy
8. In 2005, the national cluster program ―Pole de Competitivite‖ 
(Competitive Cluster) came into operation. This is a more ambitious and costly cluster 
policy than the LPS, and a quarter of LPS projects have been transformed into the Pole 
de Competitivite.   
The selection procedure of the Pole de Competitivite program can be described 
as a bottom-up process with limited competition. In the first-round cluster competition, 
the French government selected not only regional clusters as ―competitive clusters‖ (67 
out of 105, including Alsace BioValley as one of the eight selected bio-clusters), but 
also research projects in each regional cluster. Some members in a cluster collaborate 
with  members  of  other  clusters,  and  such  collaboration  is  often  supported  by  the 
cooperation of cluster organizations in both regions. In this sense, competition among 
clusters in France may be regarded as less intensive than in Germany. The total budget 
of the Pole de Competitivite program for the period2006–2011 is around 3 billion euro. 
Alsace BioValley Cluster is one of the eight regional life science clusters that 
received  R&D  subsidy  under  the  Pole  de  Competitivite  program.  The  core  cluster 
management organization in Alsace BioValley Cluster is Alsace BioValley. 
 
3. Overview of Regional Characteristics 
 
This section presents, generally, a brief history (especially, the origin of the clustering 
process) of each cluster region. Then, we discuss the regional potential with regard to 
the number of firms and variety of public organizations. 
 
3.1. Kobe Biomedical Innovation Cluster 
The  concept  of  KBIC  was  developed  in  the  middle  of  the  1990s  after  a  major 
earthquake occurred in Kobe, to induce a shift toward a high-tech cluster of medical and 
                                                   
8  See Martin et al. (2011) for more details of the LPS projects. 7 
 
pharmaceutical industries. In 1998, the City of Kobe set up a committee to forge the 
plan of KBIC, in which Prof. Imura, a member of the National Council for Science and 
Technology Policy, played an influential role. He also became the president of FBRI, a 
core cluster management organization established in 1998. 
  KBIC is located on a small artificial island close to the city center of Kobe and 
also very close to the new Kobe Airport. Today, there are approximately 200 cluster 
firms  in  KBIC.  Also,  some  large  firms  are  active  in  the  cluster.  For  example,  a 
subsidiary of a big pharma company  plays  the  role of  coordinator.  Further, thirteen 
public research institutes and incubators
9  and five universities
10  are located there. The 
new Central Municipal Hospital and a next -generation supercomputer will also be set 
up in the near future. 
 
3.2. Fuji Pharma Valley Cluster 
The concept of the Fuji Pharma Valley cluster was developed in 2001 in preparation for 
opening  a  new  public  hospital,  the  Shizuoka  Cancer  Center.  Shizuoka  Prefecture 
intended  to  establish  a  high-tech  cluster  of  medical  and  pharmaceutical  industries 
around  this  top-level  hospital,  involving  local  small  businesses.  In  2002,  the  Fuji 
Pharma Valley Initiatives was started with the First Strategic Plan and the opening of the 
Cancer Center. Indeed, a unique feature of this cluster is that it is centered at a public 
hospital and based on its clinical needs. In 2003, the Pharma Valley Center (PVC) was 
established as the local cluster management organization. PVC belongs to the Shizuoka 
Industry Creation Organization, a public foundation that supports start-up activities as 
well as business innovation and R&D by small firms in this prefecture. The Fuji Pharma 
Valley Initiatives is headed by Ken Yamaguchi, the president of the Shizuoka Cancer 
Center. 
  The Fuji Pharma Valley Cluster, one of three high-tech clusters promoted by 
the prefecture government, is located at the foot of Mount Fuji in the eastern part of 
Shizuoka  Prefecture.  The  cluster  area  comprises  several  municipalities,  including 
Mishima, Numazu, and Nagaizumi. There are no universities located in the cluster area, 
except the Numazu National College of Technology
11. The main research institutes  in 
                                                   
9  FBRI, RIKEN Center for Developmental Biology, Translational Research Informatics Center, Business 
Support Center for Biomedical Research Activities, Kobe Biotechnology Research and Human Resource 
Development Center, Kobe Medical Device Development Center, Kobe Healthcare Industry Development 
Center,  RIKEN  Center  for  Molecular  Imaging  Science,  Kobe  International  Business  Center,  Kobe 
KIMEC  Center  Building,  Kobe  Incubation  Office,  Kobe  Hybrid  Business  Center,  and  International 
Medical Device Alliance.   
10  Konan University, Kobe Gakuin University, Kobe Shukugawa   Gakuin  University,  Kobe  Women‘s 
University, and Kobe University of Health Sciences. 
11  This is one of the Koutou Senmon Gakkou (Kou -Sen), national or public technical colleges, that 8 
 
this cluster area are the research wing of the Shizuoka Cancer Center in Nagaizumi and 
the National Institute of Genetics in Mishima, which cooperate with some universities 
located outside, such as the Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology, the Tokyo 
Institute of Technology, Waseda University, and Shizuoka University. Approximately 
200 cluster firms, mostly small manufacturers, are located in the Fuji Pharma Valley 
Cluster. 
 
3.3. BioM Biotech Cluster 
The  BioM  Biotech  Cluster  is  located  in  Martinsried,  near  Munich,  where  several 
research  institutes  in  life  sciences  have  concentrated  since  the  1970s.  Spin-offs  of 
researchers from a public organization of gene research have formed a biotechnology 
cluster since the late 1980s. In the middle of the 1990s, an incubation facility (The 
Innovation  and  Startup  Center  for  Biotechnology:  IZB)  started  with  30  firms;  this 
accommodates  60  firms  today.  In  1996,  this  cluster  was  selected  by  the  BioRegio 
project for 5 years. BioM was established in 2006 as the core management organization 
of this cluster to promote marketing, networking, and coordination. Prof. Domdey, its 
current managing director, has played the leading role in the cluster management since 
the 1990s. 
  Since 1997, the number of bio-related start-ups in the BioM Biotech Cluster 
has increased from 31 to 120. More than 400 university-industry alliances have been 
achieved so far. Today, approximately 350 cluster firms (including 120 biotechnology 
start-ups) are located in this cluster. Although large firms are on the whole not active in 
clusters, several large firms such as Roche Diagnostics participate in the M4 Project as 
consortium  members.  Famous  universities  (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität  and 
Technische Universität München) and two university hospitals are located in the area. 
Further, three Max Planck Institutes and another national research institute (Helmholtz 
Center) play an important role in activating the cluster. A large incubator (IZB) supports 
start-ups. The Court of Justice for intellectual property right and the German and EU 
patent offices are also located in the proximity. 
 
3.4. BioRegion Rhine-Neckar 
The  BioRegion  Rhine-Neckar  ranges  over  the  three  federal  states  of 
Baden-Wuerttemberg  (Heidelberg,  Mannheim),  Rheinland-Pfalz  (Ludwigshafen),  and 
Hessen (Darmstadt). Despite having such a cross-state range, the association defines 
                                                                                                                                                     
integrate the courses of high schools (three years) and junior colleges (two years). Thus, Kou-Sens are 
comparable to junior colleges rather than universities. 9 
 
itself as a biotechnology cluster with biotech companies located within a radius of 30 
km. Traditionally, this cluster area has been a core of the chemical industry and life 
science research in Germany, centered at the University of Heidelberg.   
The BioRegion Rhine-Neckar cluster was supported by BioRegio subsidy from 
1996 to 2000. To execute this project, the BioRegionRhein-Neckar-Dreiecke.V. (BioRN 
association:  today,  BioRN  Network)  was  founded  in  1996.  Further,  The  BioRN 
association set up the BioRN Cluster Management GmbH (BioRN) in 2008 to prepare 
for the application for the Spitzencluster-Wettbewerb. Dr. Tidona, the current managing 
director  of  BioRN  Cluster  Management  GmbH,  was  scouted  for  the  preparation  on 
account of his expertise in bio-start-ups, venture capital, and consulting business. 
  Approximately 200 firms (including 77 biotechnology start-ups) and three big 
pharma  companies  (Roche  in  Mannheim,  Merck  in  Darmstadt,  and  Abbott  in 
Ludwigshafen)  are  located  in  the  BioRN  cluster.  Famous  universities  and  public 
research institutes are also located: the University of Heidelberg (with the university 
hospital),  the  University  of  Mannheim  for  Applied  Sciences,  Deutsches 
Krebsforschungszentrum  (German  Cancer  Research  Center)  (DKFZ),  the  European 
Molecular  Biology  Laboratory  (EMBL),  Max-Planck-Institute  of  Medical  Research, 
Heidelberg Institute for Theoretical Studies (HITS), Heidelberg Institute for Stem Cell 
Technology and Experimental Medicine (HI-STEM), and the National Centre for Tumor 
Diseases, Heidelberg (NCT). 
 
3.5. Alsace BioValley Cluster 
The Alsace BioValley Cluster is a member of the Trinational Biovally, which includes 
besides  Alsace  the  southern  part  of  Baden  in  Germany  around  Freiburg  and  the 
northwestern part of Switzerland around Basel. The concept of the BioValley cluster 
took  shape  in  1996  with  the  support  of  the  INTERREG  II  project  of  the  EU 
Commission. The INTERREG project, which was started in 1991, aimed to promote its 
network beyond the boundaries of the EU countries. By receiving public support from 
the  INTERREG,  the  Alsace  BioValley  was  founded  in  1998  as  a  central  office  for 
managing the Trinational BioValley. It cooperates with the BioValley Deutschland e.V 
and the BioValley Basel as members of the Trinational BioValley. 
There  are  approximately  390  firms  in  life  sciences,  including  big  pharma 
companies (1/3 in drug and 2/3 in medical engineering), in the Alsace BioValley cluster. 
In general, large firms are not interested in the support programs of Alsace BioValley. 
Some big pharma companies are interested only in scouting and the education that is 
provided especially in close cooperation with Strasbourg University. However, some 10 
 
large firms in Alsace actively participate in the cluster management from the viewpoint 
of regional contribution. Strasbourg University and approximately 20 public research 
institutes are located there. 
In the Trinational Biovally area, there are approximately 600 cluster firms (350 
biotechnology- and 250 medical devices-related firms) and famous research institutions 
such  as  the  University  of  Freiburg  in  Breisgau  and  the  University  of  Basel.  Forty 
percent of big multinational pharma companies are located in the Trinational BioValley 
area, especially around Basel.   
 
4. Comparison of the Management of Cluster Policies 
 
In  this  section,  we  compare  the  management  of  cluster  policies  by  the  core 
organizations in five biotechnology clusters with regard to the application process for 
the national cluster competition, management, and evaluation of R&D projects; support 
programs for cluster members; and coordination with other cluster projects.   
 
4.1. Application for cluster competition   
 
4.1.1. Kobe Biomedical Innovation Cluster for the Knowledge Cluster Initiative 
The  City  of  Kobe  and  FBRI  (especially  the  Office  of  Pro-Cluster  Kobe)  jointly 
developed formal plans of the cluster project and selected cooperative research projects 
without calling for proposals from cluster firms and universities except for the projects 
of regenerative medicine. 
At first, research subjects were determined considering the outcomes of the 
first-round  KCI.  (Since  2007,  KCI  has  been  in  the  second  round.  KBIC  was  also 
included in the targets of the first round.) Then, for each subject, some research projects 
were selected from among several candidates by the core organizers of KBIC including 
the representatives of the City of Kobe and the general manager and research director of 
FBRI. Regarding regenerative medicine for which they called for proposals, the City of 
Kobe and FBRI set up an evaluation committee including outside experts to select the 
projects. Finally, KBIC won the race and was selected by MEXT as a supported region 
of KCI. Sixteen R&D projects were supported by KCI. 
 
4.1.2. Fuji Pharma Valley for the City Area Program 
The  Fuji  Pharma  Valley  cluster  has  been  supported  by  MEXT  with  the  City  Area 
Program  (2004–2009)  and  the  Regional  Innovation  Cluster  Program  since  2010.  In 11 
 
applying for the first stage, and also in later applications, the prefecture government (the 
Office of New Industry Agglomeration) developed formal plans of the cluster project by 
determining  research  subjects  and  cooperative  research  projects  without  calling  for 
proposals  from  cluster  participants
12.  In the following (development) stage of this 
program, Yamaguchi, the head of the Fuji Pharma Valley Initiatives and president of the 
Shizuoka Cancer Center, played an important role. Ten cooperative research projects in 
four  groups  were  supported  in  the  development  stage  of  the  City  Area  Program 
(2007–2009). For the current Regional Innovation Cluster Program (2010–2012), four 
out  of  these  ten  were  selected,  considering  the  probability  of  commercialization  of 
research outcomes. 
 
4.1.3. BioM for the Spitzencluster-Wettbewerb 
In case of the M4 project, BioM called for proposals of university-industry research 
consortia and selected 32 R&D projects (currently 31) from among the proposals that fit 
well  with  each other.  Then, BioM  drew up the cluster project  plan on  the basis of 
research and budget plans of each consortia presented by the firms and universities. The 
BioM Biotech Cluster is one of the five winners among 23 candidates out of different 
technological fields in the second-round competition. 
 
4.1.4. BioRN for the Spitzencluster-Wettbewerb 
In  preparing  for  cluster  competition,  BioRN  called  for  university-industry  research 
projects. The scientific advisory board of BioRN selected the best 36 R&D projects 
from among 78 proposals and integrated the project plans into the cluster project plan. 
Five  regions,  including  the  BioRegion  Rhine-Neckar  as  the  only  bio-cluster,  were 
selected from among 38 applicants as the winners of the first-round cluster competition 
by an independent jury. 
 
4.1.5. Alsace BioValley for the Pole de Competitivite 
Alsace BioValley prepared a proposal for the Pole de Competitivite, collaborating from 
the beginning with cluster firms and universities (in other French bio-clusters, cluster 
management  organizations  usually  do  not  intervene  or  support  the  development  of 
research plans by cluster firms). Finally, the board of directors of the Alsace BioValley 
Cluster selected research projects (consortia) to be included in the cluster project. 
 
                                                   
12  Calling  for  proposals  of  research  subjects  and  research  projects  was  originally  intended  but  not 
realized. 12 
 
4. 2. Management and evaluation of R&D projects 
 
4.2.1. Selection of members of research consortia 
There are no explicit conditions for consortium members in KBIC. Practically, however, 
consortium members should be the organizations that participate in and cooperate with 
KBIC. 
  In case of the Fuji Pharma Valley cluster, selection of consortia members is left 
to  the  project  leaders  who  are  top  researchers  of  the  Cancer  Center,  the  National 
Institute of Genetics, and the Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology. There 
are no conditions  for cluster firms,  but  in  fact,  the research  consortia  supported by 
MEXT programs include only a few local firms; in this sense, most cluster firms are not 
directly integrated into METI programs.   
  Members were determined before they applied for cluster competition in BioM 
and BioRN. Regarding BioM, the associate partners, who joined the M4 project later, do 
not  have  the  right  to  receive  financial  supports.  However,  M4  is  a  very  dynamic 
program: existing and new R&D projects are repeatedly evaluated for continuation and 
acceptance. Some R&D projects are not directly funded by the M4 program, but are still 
a part of the personalized medicine initiative. 
  As  for  the  Alsace  BioValley  Cluster,  members  of  the  R&D  projects  to  be 
included  in  the  Pole  de  Competitivite  were  determined  before  they  applied  for 
membership. In the Pole de Competitivite, every research consortium has to include at 
least two private firms and a university (or a public research institute). 
  In the Alsace BioValley Cluster, a firm must be a cluster member to obtain 
public  R&D  subsidy  (a  firm  has  to  pay  a  small  amount  of  membership  fee  to  be 
registered  as  a  member).  Before  submitting  a  research  proposal  to  the  French 
government, a cluster firm has to get the approval of the Alsace BioValley Cluster. By 
this procedure, Alsace BioValley reduces duplications and waste of research funds. 
 
4.2.2. Allocation of R&D subsidy 
There is no rule on the ratio of R&D subsidy to total budgets of R&D projects with 
regard to MEXT programs. The City of Kobe and FBRI allocate the amount of R&D 
subsidy considering the needs of each project in KBIC. Similarly, PVC allocates the 
amount of R&D subsidy based on project plans. Because all research projects to be 
subsidized are initiated from the clinical needs and scientific seeds of the core research 
institutes, these institutes play the central role in project budgeting.   
  In case of Spitzencluster-Wettbewerb, the federal government takes the rule of 13 
 
the matched funding scheme on the subsidy ratio of R&D projects. That is, the ratio of 
R&D subsidy in each R&D project is fixed as 50%. Furthermore, only private firms can 
be subsidized in BioRN, while universities as their research partners obtain research 
budgets through commissioned R&D of subsidized firms. 
  In the Pole de Competitivite, R&D consortia can obtain public subsidy up to 
60% of their research budgets: consortia of private firms can be covered up to 50%, and 
those of universities can be funded up to 100%. In this way, the cluster policies in 
Germany and France urge subsidized firms to put in reasonable efforts. 
 
4.2.3. Monitoring of research projects 
MEXT programs require project monitoring. More concretely, in KBIC the coordinators 
of  FBRI  regularly  monitor  the  progress  of  R&D  projects  and  hold  formal  research 
meetings once a year. In the case of Fuji Pharma Valley, PVC monitors the progress of 
subsidized  R&D  projects  every  year,  with  internal  evaluation  by  the  heads  of  the 
Pharma  Valley  Initiatives  and  outside  experts.  Moreover,  PVC  organizes  annual 
meetings in Tokyo with presentations of research outcomes that are not limited to the 
research projects supported by MEXT programs. 
  BioM performs an accounting audit every six months for each research project. 
Within the M4 program, they conduct several rounds of evaluations of existing and new 
projects.   
  BioRN strictly monitors the progress of R&D projects. BioRN has developed 
an  original  management  tool  by  which  cluster  firms  have  to  input  information  on 
implementation  of  research  budgets.  Otherwise,  they  cannot  expend  public  R&D 
subsidy (―no report, no fund‖). BioRN monitors the expenditure of research funds with 
this special software (on the whole, cluster management organizations do not monitor 
how cluster firms expend research budgets). 
  Alsace BioValley regularly monitors the progress of R&D projects by sharing 
information with the corporate treasurers of the subsidized firms. 
 
4.2.4. Project evaluation 
KCI publishes interim evaluations three years after the commencement of the projects. 
The government checks the self-evaluations provided by each cluster region, and on the 
basis of this, decides which cluster projects should be continued and what the budget 
should  be.  In  the  case  of  KBIC,  the  first  self-evaluation  by  FBRI  was  regarded  as 
upper-biased  by  MEXT  and  subjected  to  strict  re-evaluation.  Based  on  the  interim 
evaluation, the allocation of research budgets was often revised and, in some cases, 14 
 
discontinued.  KCI  actually  allows  the  research  consortia  to  commercialize  research 
outcomes. The final evaluation of the first-round KCI was completed in a similar way to 
the interim evaluation. KCI published the final evaluation reports in 2006. 
  The City Area Program publishes final evaluations of completed projects, while 
interim evaluations are not conducted for short programs for three years. The results of 
final  evaluations  of  the  first  (basic)  stage  may  affect  acceptance  to  the  next,  the 
development stage, with doubled budget. Moreover, PVC has outside experts evaluate 
its performance at the end of each strategic plan, independent of the evaluations for the 
MEXT programs. 
  In case of BioM, the federal government will conduct an interim evaluation of 
the M4 project at the end of the second year. BioM is obliged to provide the government 
with  information  on  project  outcomes  for  project  evaluation.  Based  on  the  interim 
evaluation, the federal government can take a decision on which projects to continue 
and with how much budget. The project evaluations will not be made public, although 
BioM can ascertain the results. 
  The scientific advisory board of BioRN conducts strict evaluation of each R&D 
project. If a project turns out to be without promise, BioRN recommends the federal 
government to cease the support of the project and to reallocate its budgets to other 
projects.  The  government  usually  follows  the  suggestion  of  BioRN.  Further,  any 
technologically  successful  project  is  requested  to  generate  positive  cash  flows  from 
licenses or new products.   
  In the Pole de Competitivite, Alsace BioValley does not conduct self-evaluation. 
The central government entrusted the interim evaluation to Boston Consulting Group 
(BCG). Alsace BioValley  provided them with  their future action plan  and scientific 
roadmap  based  on  the  project  outcomes  in  the  first  period  (2006–2008).  Based  on 
BCG‘s evaluation, the government could finally decide on which cluster projects should 
be continued and with how much budget. 
 
4.3. Support programs 
KCI basically provides financial supports for university-industry R&D cooperation in 
selected  regions.  Further,  the  City  of  Kobe  provides  several  types  of  hard  and  soft 
support measures for cluster members in KBIC. As examples of hard supports, the City 
of  Kobe  provides  tax  reduction,  R&D  subsidy,  and  investment  funding  (Kobe 
Biomedical Fund and Kobe Life Science IP Fund). For soft support measures, the City 
of  Kobe  and  FBRI  set  up  the  Office  of  Pro-Cluster  Kobe,  which  coordinates  the 
activities  among  cluster  members  in  KBIC  through  matching  of  research  partners, 15 
 
organizing events and meetings, and providing consulting services. Moreover, a major 
task of KBIC is to attract external firms and institutes to invest in the cluster area. 
Like KCI, the City Area Program and the Regional Innovation Cluster Program 
provide financial supports for university-industry R&D cooperation in selected regions. 
In the case of Fuji Pharma Valley, around 70% of MEXT subsidy goes directly to the 
research projects, while the rest is used for overhead costs and coordination. Further, 
Shizuoka  Prefecture  (the  Shizuoka  Industry  Creation  Organization)  provides  several 
types of hard and soft support measures to cluster firms. This is because the Regional 
Innovation  Cluster  Program  requests  matched  funding  at  the  cluster  level.  (Cluster 
management organizations should provide as much funds as the MEXT subsidy.) Hard 
support measures comprise subsidies and loans for start-ups and innovative small firms 
as  well  as  for  R&D  projects  including  industry-university  consortia.  Soft  measures 
comprise the organization of seminars and events (business and research matching) as 
well as consulting services. On the contrary, PVC provides no hard support and very 
little soft support to local small firms: business and research matching is organized once 
a year and social meetings, twice a year. 
BioM provides various supports to firms not only in the BioM Biotech Cluster 
but also to firms in the State of Bavaria. As hard supports, BioM allocates federal R&D 
subsidy and provides incubation service. Further, its soft supports include networking in 
and beyond the cluster region, organizing meetings and events, providing information 
on websites, consulting services, and lobbying. 
  BioRN  allocates  federal  R&D  subsidy  to  consortia  firms  and  provides 
infrastructures  such  as  office  spaces.  BioRN  also  provides  various  soft  supports: 
matching of research partners and venture capitalists, organizing events and meetings, 
and providing consulting services. 
  Alsace  BioValley  allocates  public  R&D  subsidy  to  research  projects.  It  is 
noteworthy that, in order to apply for a public R&D subsidy, the proposal should be 
approved  by  the  Alsace  BioVally  Cluster.  It  also  provides  various  soft supports  for 
member  firms:  matching  of  research  partners,  organizing  events  and  meetings, 
supporting applications for public subsidies, providing database service, and supporting 
international marketing (business representation). The contents and scope of support 
programs differ according to the ranks of membership (normal and premium): database 
and business representation services are provided only to premium members. Recently, 
Alsace BioValley has started supporting start-ups. 
 
4.4. Coordination with other cluster projects 16 
 
Cluster projects in the Kansai area (especially Osaka-Saito and Kobe) aim at forming 
wide-area  clusters  (e.g.,  Kansai  Super  Cluster).  However,  up  to  now  there  have 
practically been no collaborative research projects between FBRI and the Senri Life 
Science  Foundation  in  Osaka,  although  cooperation  between  universities  is  active. 
Further, there is practically no international cooperation with clusters outside Japan, 
except for that with Medicon Valley in Denmark and Sweden. 
  PVC  recently  conducted  some  exchange  programs  with  other  national  and 
foreign cluster organizations. In 2008, the staff of the French bio-cluster organizations 
in Paris, Toulouse, and Nantes visited the Fuji Pharma Valley, and then the PVC staff 
visited these French clusters in 2009. Moreover, PVC organized a national conference 
on cancer in February 2010, where the members of seven medical cluster organizations 
in Japan presented their relationship with local firms. The core research centers in the 
Pharma Valley cluster cooperate in R&D with universities and private firms in other 
areas (especially in  Tokyo); however, such cooperation is not based on inter-cluster 
coordination.  Thus  far,  no  effort  has  been  made  to  establish  inter-cluster  R&D 
cooperation.  According  to  the  Third  Strategic  Plan  starting  in  2011,  they  intend  to 
promote  the  commercialization  of  research  outcomes  through  synergy  effects  of 
inter-cluster cooperation.   
  One  of  the  main  tasks  of  BioM  is  to  coordinate  interregional  relationships 
among clusters in Germany. BioM is also involved with the Advanced Biotech Cluster 
Platforms for Europe (ABCEurope) project, which coordinates activities of European 
clusters
13. Prof. Domdey, the founder and managing director of BioM, is active in 
coordination with other clusters in Europe.  Although there are no formal agreements 
with other European clusters, BioM is a founding member of  the Council of European 
BioRegions (CEBR), and cooperates with other European biotechnology clusters within 
this initiative on different levels. Moreover, two pro jects of European interregional 
cooperation are planned and submitted to the EU Commission.   
One of the recent major tasks of BioRN is to promote international cooperation 
with other clusters concentrating on complementary technologies in relation to BioRN. 
For example, BioRN  intends to set up  a new big project with Cambridge (UK) and 
Leuven (Belgium) and will  be applying for a large-scale EU subsidy for this  project. 
BioRN is not interested in cooperation within Germany, because it puts higher value on 
worldwide cooperation. 
                                                   
13  This project has been supported by the Europe Innova (EU Commission) since 2009. European clusters 
include PCB Barcelona, Alsace BioValley, OneNucleus Cambridge, BioWinBelgium, Technologiepark 
Heidelberg, INNOVA Hungary, MVA Medicon Valley, BioM Munich, Medicen Paris, Stockholm Science 
City, Cluster bioPMed Turin and Wallonia, and MATIMOB Israel. 17 
 
In France, the Alsace BioValley cluster has been cooperating with Lyon and 
Toulouse regions as the Life Science Corridor since 2008. These regions have different 
but  related  scientific  focus  within  life  science,  which  enables  them  to  have  smooth 
cooperation.  Alsace  BioValley  also  participates  in  the  ABC  Europe  project  that 
coordinates  European  life  science  clusters.  Further,  Alsace  BioValley  is  active  in 





We  could  find  several  significant  similarities  and  differences  in  the  five  cases  of 
Japanese and European clusters by comparing the selection procedure of national cluster 
competition and the management of cluster policies by the core cluster management 
organizations. This section discusses how they may be related with the performance of 
the regional clusters, referring to the previous literature. Our major findings  can be 
summarized as follows (see Table 2).   
 
5.1. Selection procedure of national cluster competition 
We found that the competitive processes and the degree of competition in the national 
cluster  policies  have  significant  differences.  For  example,  in  Japan,  the  top-down 
selection process by the government is relatively prevalent in the national cluster policy, 
except for the City Area Program. In contrast, Germany‘s national cluster policy takes a 
bottom-up process with hard competition. The French national cluster policy takes a 
bottom-up  process  with  limited  cluster  competition,  different  from  both  Japan  and 
Germany. In this sense, the City Area Program by MEXT is more similar to the French 
policy than to the other cluster policies in Japan. 
Differences with regard to the competitive processes in cluster policies would 
potentially affect the performance of regional clusters. There are several advantages and 
disadvantages of the bottom-up selection procedure in R&D projects (Eickelpasch and 
Fritsch 2005). We list three advantages of the bottom-up selection procedures in the 
following
14. 
First, diverse approaches (ideas) would allow one to learn through experience, 
using  different  methods  of  problem solving,  and identify  more  superior solutions. 
Competition between alternative approaches may be regarded as an effective means of 
                                                   
14  There are also potential disadvantages to the bottom-up selection procedure. For example, it takes 
much time for the selection procedure and needs discerning and equitable judgment of proposals. Further, 
it may promote ―picking the winner‖ and cause regional gaps. 18 
 
stimulating the search for better solutions and their dissemination. This is in line with 
the  theory  of  federalism  or,  more  generally,  systems  competition  (Frey  and 
Eichenberger 1999; Vanberg and Kerber 1994). 
Second, if the concepts are developed in the bottom-up process, the solutions 
and ideas will be custom-tailored, and these could be innovative, not only because of 
the  competition  between  the  concepts  but  also  through  interaction  with  the  public 
administration (Toedtling and Tripple 2005). Therefore, the competitive approach can 
play an important role and function as a laboratory for discovering and disseminating 
superior ways to organize innovative activities.   
Third, a great advantage of the bottom-up approach is that applicants (in this 
case, the core cluster management organizations) have a considerable degree of freedom 
in arranging the organizational form of innovative activities that correspond to their 
specific regional needs. This is because there is no reason to believe that policymakers 
are better informed than the managers of the local management organizations or firms 
about the economic potential of their targets (Wolf 1993; Cowling et al. 1999; Hospers 
et al. 2009). 
 
5.2. Management of cluster policies by the core management organizations 
There are several significant similarities and differences in the management of cluster 
policies by the core management organizations.   
       First, the process of preparation for the applications for the national cluster 
policies is different across cluster regions. In Japan and France, the core management 
organizations  start  developing  research  plans  from  the  beginning.  On  the  contrary, 
BioM and BioRN did not intervene in the planning of R&D projects. They called for 
R&D proposals from cluster firms and drew up their project plans on the basis of the 
selected research proposals. In the five clusters, it is common that the core management 
organizations  first  reviewed  R&D  projects  before  the  government‘s  screening.  This 
double review process of R&D projects may be stricter in Germany because cluster 
management organizations are not involved in the development of initial R&D plans. 
The  discussion  on  the  advantages  of  the  bottom-up  selection  procedure  is  also 
applicable to the process of preparation for the application. We expect that German 
clusters would adequately benefit from these advantages by calling for proposals of 
R&D projects from diverse cluster members.   
  Second, we found several  differences  in  the management of R&D projects. 
With regard to the MEXT programs, there is no rule on the ratio of R&D subsidy to 19 
 
total  budgets  of R&D projects
15. Thus,  in KBIC and  the Fuji Pharma Valley,  R&D 
subsidy is allocated to each project according to project plans. In Germany and France, 
the matched funding scheme  is adopted on the subsidy ratio of R&D projects , which 
requires substantial commitment by the subsidized firms. According to Mora-Valentin et 
al.  (2004),  commitment  is  among  the  most  important  success  factors  of  research 
collaborations. Thus, it may be desirable to  provide subsidized firms  with sufficient 
incentives for more commitment.   
  Third, we also found differences in the extent of regular monitoring of R&D 
projects  by  the  core  cluster  management  organizations.  Cluster  management 
organizations in  all the  five regions conduct regular monitoring of subsidized R&D 
projects. Among them, monitoring by BioRN may be  the strongest. BioRN developed 
an original management tool by which it monitors the  research expenditures of each 
R&D project. BioRN further checks the profitability of project outcomes. 
  Fourth,  there  are  several  differences  in  the  process  of  the  government‘s 
(interim) project evaluation. In KBIC, the Fuji Pharma Valley, and the BioRN Cluster, 
the  cluster  management  organizations  are  closely  involved  in  project  evaluation  by 
conducting self-evaluation of R&D projects. BioM does not evaluate each project, but 
summarizes the entire project outcomes  for the government. Interim evaluations are 
made  public  in  Japan,  but  not  in  Germany.  The  French  government  entrusts  the 
responsibility of  conducting  interim  evaluations  to  a private consultant firm. Alsace 
BioValley  does  not  conduct  self-evaluations,  but  provides  this  consultant  with  the 
project outcomes. 
  Strict monitoring and evaluation of collaborative R&D projects may be key 
factors  for  successful  R&D  projects  for  the  following  reasons.  The  outcome  of  an 
innovation process is unknown in advance, and this may induce research partners to 
behave in opportunistic ways (Kranton and Minehart 2001). Without trust in cooperative 
R&D, participants may take opportunistic actions such as ―cheating, shirking, distorting 
information,  misleading  partners,  providing  substandard  products/services,  and 
appropriating  partners‘  critical  resources‖  (Das  and  Teng  1998,  p.  492).  Control 
mechanisms by a third party  are indispensable for reducing the losses  generated by 
opportunistic behavior (Zucker 1986; Das and Teng 1998). 
  Fifth, we found that every core cluster management organization in the five 
regions  provides  both  hard  (R&D-related)  and  soft  (networking  and  coordination) 
support programs to cluster members. As specific differences, KBIC makes much effort 
                                                   
15  As mentioned earlier, MEXT has changed the rule since 2006 so that the government subsidizes up to 
50% of the total budget. Another half should be financed from local authorities and other sources. 20 
 
to bring in firms and research institutes from outside and to provide them with research 
funds. In the Fuji Pharma Valley cluster, various types of supports to local firms are 
mostly provided by some other organization within the prefecture. BioM offers support 
programs even to the firms that are not located in the Munich cluster but in the State of 
Bavaria,  while  supports  by  other  cluster  management  organizations  targeted  in  this 
paper are limited to their specific cluster regions. Further, the contents and scope of the 
support  programs  provided  by  Alsace  BioValley  differ  according  to  the  ranks  of 
membership (normal and premium). 
  It is justifiable that core cluster management organizations provide both hard 
and  soft  supports.  Regarding  hard  support,  there  are  two  types  of  market  failure 
concerning  R&D:  incomplete  appropriability  of  R&D  outcomes  (Griliches  1992; 
Spence 1984; Teece 1986) and high uncertainty of R&D activity (Malmberg et al. 1996). 
R&D  support  by  a  third  party  promotes  collaborative  R&D  projects,  which  could 
internalize knowledge spillovers and reduce uncertainty through improved coordination 
and the pooling of risks and resources. Soft support can also be indispensable for the 
enhancement  of  regional  performance.  The  government  is  considered  to  be  able  to 
alleviate various knowledge-specific failures in the knowledge-based economy, whereas 
the rationale for traditional industrial policy derives from welfare economics and market 
failure arguments (Dobrinsky 2009). Knowledge-specific (networking) failures involve 
a large number of agents/stakeholders as well as complex links and interactions among 
them. As Porter (2000, p.26) has indicated, cluster policies should aim at ‗‗removing 
obstacles, relaxing constraints, and eliminating inefficiencies that impede productivity 
and innovation in the cluster.‘‘ 
  Finally,  we  observe  some  heterogeneity  in  the  motivation  of  cluster 
management  organizations  toward  coordination  with  other  cluster  projects.  All  five 
regions engaged in interregional cooperation. However, KBIC, the Fuji Pharma Valley 
cluster, and BioRN are not active in domestic cooperation and have just recently started 
international  cooperation,  while  BioM  and  Alsace  BioValley  have  been  actively 
engaged in domestic and international cooperation. 
  Coordination with other cluster projects also may be an important element that 
contributes to the performance of regional clusters. As Desrochers (2001) insists, local 
firms  typically  regard  outside  collaborative  partners  as  more  important  than  their 
neighbors even in highly advanced clusters such as Silicon Valley. Further, Nishimura 
and Okamuro (2011a) empirically confirm that local firms collaborating with partners 
outside the cluster show higher R&D productivity in terms of quantity and quality. This 
implies  that  a  support  system  is  necessary  through  which  local  firms  can  find 21 
 
appropriate partners according to their research topics, even if such partners are located 




This paper provides a detailed comparison of the following five cases of Japanese and 
European clusters in biotechnology: (1) Kobe Biomedical Innovation Cluster (KBIC) in 
Kobe (Japan), (2) Fuji Pharma Valley Cluster in Shizuoka Prefecture (Japan), (3) BioM 
Biotech  Cluster  in  Munich  (Germany),  (4)  BioRegion  Rhine-Neckar  in  Heidelberg 
(Germany), and (5) Alsace BioValley Cluster in Strasbourg (France). We pay special 
attention  to  the  national  cluster  policy  and  its  management  by  the  core  cluster 
management organization in each region.   
Through  in-depth  interviews,  we  found  several  significant  similarities  and 
differences among these five cases. We also discussed how the management of cluster 
policies by the core management organizations may be related with the performance of 
regional  clusters.  We  intend  to  develop  our  research  on  comparative  evaluations  of 
national  cluster  policies  and  their  management  in  different  countries  with  different 
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Table 1 Overview of recent cluster policies in Japan, Germany, and France 
 
 
   
Policy Name
Knowledge Cluster Initiative
(Reginal Innovation Cluster Program since 2010)
City Area Program




Pole de Competitivite (Competitive Cluster)












Budget 68.5 billion yen (2002－2009)
for each cluster 100-200 million yen per year;     About
20 billion yen (2002-2006)
196 billion yen (2001－2007) EUR 400 million (2008－2014) EUR 3 billion (2006－2011)
Program Initiator
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science     and
Technology (MEXT)
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science     and
Technology (MEXT)
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF)
DGE (General Directorate for Enterprise, Ministry for
Economy, Finance and Industry)
Source of Fund
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science      and
Technology (MEXT)
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science      and
Technology (MEXT)
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF)
Ministry for Economy, Finance and Industry; Ministry of
Interior and Regional Development; The French National
Research Agency; OSEO; FUI
Number of Selected Regional Clusters 12 (first round)
59 in the 1. period, starting in 2002-2006, ending in
2004-2008); 30 in the 2. period starting in 2007-2009
19 5 67
Number of submitted applications 30 ? None (Complete top-down selection) 38 10527 
 
Table 2   
 
 
National cluster policy Knowledge Cluster Initiatives City Area Program Pole de Competitivite (Competitive Cluster)
Name of regional cluster Kobe Biomedical Innovation Cluster Fuji Pharma Valley Cluster BioM Biotech Cluster BioRegion Rhein-Neckar Alsace BioValley Cluster
Location Kobe, Japan Eastern part of Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan Munich (Martinsried), Germany Heidelberg, Germany Strasbourg, France
Core management organization City of Kobe, Foundation for Biomedical Research and Innovation Pharma Valley Center BioM Biotech Cluster Development GmbH BioRN Cluster Management GmbH Alsace BioValley
Regional potential 200 firms, 7 universties and 12 public research institutes
200 firms, no universities (a national technical college), 2 public
research institutes (one with a hospital)
350 firms (120 biotech start-ups), 2 universities, its hospitals
and 3 Max-Planck-Institutes
200 firms (77 biotech start-ups and 3 big pharmas), 2
universities, a university hospital and 6 public research
institutes
390 firms in life science including big pharma (1/3 in drug and
2/3 in medical engineering) and a university and 20 public
research institutes
Selection of regional cluster projects by the
government
Top-down process with imited competition Bottom-up process with limited competition Bottom-up process with hard competition Bottom-up process with hard competition Bottom-up process with limited competition
Selection of the cluster participants
Any firm in the cluster region focusing on biotechnology and medical
engineering is a cluster firm.
Any firm in the cluster region focusing on biotechnology and medical
engineering is a cluster firm.
Any firm in the cluster region focusing on biotechnology  is a
cluster firm.
Any firm in the cluster region focusing on biotechnology is a
cluster firm.
membership fee required
Calling for research projects no (except for a specific field) no yes yes no
Preparation for application for the national
cluster project
Management organization selected research projects and prepared
for application.
The prefecture government selected research projects and prepared
for application.
Management organization drew up the project plan based on
selected research proposals.
Management organization drew up the project plan based on
selected research proposals.
Management organization drew up the project plan
collaborating with members of selected consortia.
Regular monitoring of research projects
Regular monitoring by the coordinators; formal research meetings
annually
Regular monitoring by the coordinators; formal research meetings
annually
Accounting audit every six months for each project
Regular monitoring by the scientific advisory board; Budget
reallocation according to performance; Requirement of
positive cash-flow
Regular monitoring by sharing information with corporate
treasurers
Project evaluation: interim
By the government; made public; discontinuance or budget
reallocation possible
No interim evaluation because of short programs (3 years); Final
evaluation by the government; made public
By the government; not made public; discontinuance or
budget reallocation possible
By the government; not made public; discontinuance or
budget reallocation possible
Entrusted to a foreign consulting group; discontinuance or
budget reallocation possible
Support programs (hard)
Allocation of national R&D subsidy and providing infrastructure;
Additional supports by the cluster management organization
Allocation and management of national R&D subsidies; Further
supports for small local firms by the prefecture government through
management organization and a public foundation
Allocation of federal R&D subsidy and incubation service
Allocation of federal R&D subsidy and providing office
spaces
Allocation of public R&D subsidy
Support programs (soft) Partner matching, events and meetings, and consulting
Few direct support for small local firms by the cluster management
organization
Partner matching, events and meetings, information on the
web, consulting, and lobbying
Partner matching, VC matching, events and meetings, and
consulting
Partner matching, events and meetings, support of subsidy
application, database service, international marketing
Utilization for support programs 3/4 of cluster firms utilize support measures. Less than half utilize supports.
Role of large firms Some are active in the cluster.
No local large firms active in the cluster. Core research institutes
cooperate with some large firms in Tokyo.
Some are among consortium members. Active
Inactive; interested only in scouting and education; A big
pharma is the vice-president of the board of directors.
Coordination with other cluster projects
No concrete organizational cooperation. Few international
cooperation.
Active exchanges with domestic and foreign clusters, but no
concrete organizational cooperation.
Coordination of interregional relationship in Germany; Active
but informal relationship with other European clusters
Promotion of international cooperation; No interest in
cooperation within Germany
Cooperation within the Trinational BioValley and with other
French clusters; Active in worldwide cooperation
Spitzencluster-Wettbewerb (Cutting-Edge Cluster Competition)    wp-1 
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